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Ulysses: A Mighty Hero in the Fight for
Freedom of Expression
Marc J. Randazza, JD, MAMC, LLM
11 U. MASS L. REV. 268
ABSTRACT
James Joyce’s Ulysses was a revolutionary novel, and this much is common
knowledge. What is not common knowledge is how useful Ulysses was in pushing
the boundaries of freedom of expression. This masterpiece of literature opened the
door for modern American free speech jurisprudence, but in recent years has become
more of an object of judicial scorn. This Article seeks to educate legal scholars as to
the importance of the novel, and attempts to reverse the anti-intellectual spirit that
runs through modern American jurisprudence, where the novel is now more used as
an object of mockery, or as a negative example.
AUTHOR NOTE
The author is a free speech lawyer representing dissident journalists, protesters, and
those who find their artistic expression attacked by the powers that be. A former
journalist, Randazza has a BA in journalism from the University of Massachusetts,
and a master’s in journalism from the University of Florida. He earned his Juris
Doctor degree from Georgetown University, and he also holds an LL.M. in
international intellectual property law from the Università degli studi di Torino.
Randazza is admitted to practice law in Arizona, California, Florida, Massachusetts,
and Nevada; dozens of federal courts; and the Supreme Court of the United States.
Randazza previously served as a legal commentator for Fox News, and is now a legal
columnist and commentator for CNN on free speech issues.
The author extends his thanks to Professor John McCourt of Roma Tre University
for rekindling his interest in Joyce and for giving him the honor of presenting the
earliest version of this work at the Annual James Joyce School in Trieste, Italy. This
work is dedicated to Professor McCourt and the 20th Annual Trieste Joyce School.
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I think this is the most damnable slush and filth that
ever polluted paper in print. . . . There are no words I
know to describe, even vaguely, how disgusted I am;
not with the mire of his effusion but with all those
whose minds are so putrid that they dare allow such
muck and sewage of the human mind to besmirch the
world by repeating it—and in print, through which
medium it may reach young minds. Oh my God, the
horror of it.
—Letter to Margaret Anderson1
“[O]ne man’s vulgarity is another’s lyric.”
—Justice John Marshall Harlan2
I. INTRODUCTION

I

f Ulysses could be personified, its statue would belong on grandiose
pedestals in prominent squares in American cities. Truly, it belongs
in the same place that the Marquis de Lafayette stands in American
history.3
Lafayette, a foreigner with affection for the cause of liberty in
America, lent his fortune and name to the cause. Ulysses later joined
the fight, more as a conscript than a volunteer, to ensure that freedom

1

2
3

PAUL VANDERHAM, JAMES JOYCE AND CENSORSHIP: THE TRIALS OF ULYSSES 1
(1998) (quoting MARGARET C. ANDERSON, MY THIRTY YEARS’ WAR 212-13
(Covici, Friede 1930)).
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971).
Marquis de Lafayette was a general who served in both the French Royal Army
and the Continental Army during the American Revolutionary War. After
leaving France in pursuit of contributing to the freedom of the American
colonies he worked side by side with General George Washington (the later
president). Lafayette was instrumental in gaining French support for the
colonials and heightening Washington’s fame. For more information see P.C.
HEADLEY, THE LIFE OF THE MARQUIS DE LAFAYETTE, MAJOR GENERAL IN THE
UNITED STATES ARMY IN THE WAR OF THE REVOLUTION, (A.L. Burt Co.,
Publishers, N.Y., 1903).
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of expression in America truly meant something. Lafayette entered the
history books a hero, and centuries have not tarnished his noble name.
Joyce and Ulysses entered on the same footing, but in recent decades,
their contribution to freedom of expression seems to be fading into the
dust of history, as courts seem more interested in pointing to Joyce’s
writing as an example of shoddy literature. While there is room for
debate on Ulysses’s literary merits and Joyce’s writing style, Ulysses
has done enough for the cause of liberty to deserve a medal—not the
judicial scorn that has plagued it in recent decades. To continue the
metaphor that began this paragraph, if there were statues to Ulysses
across America, they would very likely be covered in graffiti and
surrounded by trash, untended by a nation that turned its back on
knowledge and beauty.
For decades, much of the American judiciary tended these
metaphorical monuments to Ulysses. Beginning August 7, 1934, more
than 300 judges mentioned Ulysses or James Joyce in their opinions.
These citations—referring directly to the landmark decision United
States v. One Book Entitled Ulysses by James Joyce,4—are universally
positive. 5 Naturally, since that decision was the one that signaled a
tectonic shift in American obscenity law, such judicial reverence was
to be expected—especially because the legal shift was one protecting a
piece of literary brilliance.
In the 1980s, the judicial attitude toward Joyce changed: No longer
the hero of expanding free expression rights, Joyce instead was used as
an example of bad writing. Cases citing James Joyce’s writings or
Ulysses directly have a greater tendency to criticize Joyce’s obscure
writing style—and make it apparent that most judges are not literary
scholars. Today, a judge is much more likely to mention Joyce to

4
5

72 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1934).
See infra Case Table; see e.g., United States v. Head, 317 F. Supp. 1138, 1142
(E.D. La. 1970); Grove Press v. Christenberry, 175 F. Supp. 488, 498 (S.D.N.Y.
1959); Hanby v. Alaska, 479 P.2d 486, 492 (Alaska 1970); People v. Richmond
Cnty. News Inc., 179 N.Y.S.2d 76, 79 (Ct. Spec. Sess. 1958); Burke v. Kingsley
Books, 142 N.Y.S.2d 735, 740 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1955); People v. Vanguard Press,
Inc., 84 N.Y.S.2d 427, 429 (Magis. Ct. 1947); People ex rel. Sumner v. Miller,
279 N.Y.S. 583, 585 (Magis. Ct. 1935).
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mock another lawyer’s writing than he is to invoke Joyce’s name as a
case citation or with any degree of reverence.6
And how sad that is, as it does not seem to be a concerted effort,
but yet another marker of how the United States truly changed in the
1980s. Reviewing legal texts is like looking at the striations in a layer
of rock. Where geologists can point to a line and see an indication of
an event of mass extinction, we can look at these layers and see an
intellectual die-off.
As previously noted, I am not a scholar of great literature. But, as
Justice Potter Stewart famously stated, “I know it when I see it.”7 I
was introduced to him in an act of literary conscription. My high
school teacher unceremoniously dropped Dubliners on our desks and
insisted that we read it, or we would not pass the class, would not
graduate, and would then never amount to anything. I resisted, finding
no interest whatsoever, instead (most ironically) preferring to bury my
nose into the works of Anthony Burgess. The irony lies in the fact that
while I might have found Burgess more appealing to my teenage punkrock nature, Burgess himself may have been the greatest Joyce fan in
history.8 He so adored Ulysses that he smuggled a copy in to England,

6

7

8

See infra Case Table; e.g., State Roads Comm’n v. Parker, 344 A.2d 109 (Md.
1975); Brunwasser v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 518 F. Supp. 1321, 1324
(W.D. Pa. 1981); Conchatta v. Evanko, 83 F. App’x. 437 (3d Cir. 2003);
Newcom Holdings v. IMBROS Corp., 369 F. Supp. 2d 700 (E.D. Virginia
2005); Lease v. Fishel, 712 F. Supp. 2d 359, 376 (M.D. Pa. 2010); Eng v.
Tingen, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5634 (E.D.N.C. Jan. 12, 2015); Eve Cuyen
Butterworth v. 281 St. Nicholas Partners LLC, 2014 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 3379
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. July 22, 2014); Catholic Health Initiatives Iowa Corp. v.
Sebelius, 841 F. Supp. 2d 270, 271 (D.D.C. 2012); see also supra Part VII and
accompanying text.
Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (U.S. 1964) (Stewart J, concurring). I have
reached the conclusion, which I think is confirmed at least by negative
implication in the Court’s decisions since Roth and Alberts, that under the First
and Fourteenth Amendments, criminal laws in this area are constitutionally
limited to hard-core pornography. Id. I shall not today attempt further to define
the kinds of material I understand to be embraced within that shorthand
description; and perhaps I could never succeed in intelligibly doing so. Id. But I
know it when I see it, and the motion picture involved in this case is not that. Id.
See generally Rosa Mari Bollettieri & Serenella Zanotti, Re Ulysses: A View
from the Burgess Archives, in OUTSIDE INFLUENCES, ESSAYS IN HONOR OF
FRANCA RUGGIERI 37, 37 (Richard Ambrosini et al. eds., 2014). Burgess is,
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where it was banned at the time, by literally clothing himself in it—
”As a schoolboy I sneaked the two-volume Odyssey Press edition into
England, cut up into sections and distributed all over my body.”9 That
is what I call dedication.
It was not until many years later, while I was working on a fishing
boat off the coast of Alaska that Joyce took me captive. 10 With no
modern communication on the boat, I was left with two categories of
reading materials—a collection of 3D pornographic comic books and
the works of James Joyce. After devouring the comic books, I
reluctantly picked up Joyce. I did manage to graduate from high school
without reading Joyce, but at that moment, I regretted having done so.
II. JOYCE AND THE HUMAN CONDITION
In Joyce’s words I found the human condition painted on the fabric
of reality without retouching or any rose-hued tone in those famous
round glasses. For example, in Giacomo Joyce, he wrote of his
experience at the opera in Trieste:
The sodden walls ooze a steamy damp. A symphony of
smells fuses the mass of huddled human forms: sour
reek of armpits, nozzled oranges, melting breast
ointments, mastick water, the breath of suppers of
sulphurous garlic, foul phosphorescent farts, opoponax,
the frank sweat of marriageable and married
womankind, the soapy stink of men.11

9

10

11

despite his success, known to have had a serious inferiority complex coupled
with hero worship when it came to Joyce.
ANTHONY BURGESS, RE JOYCE 83 (W.W. Norton & Co., 2000) (1965)
(published in England as HERE COMES EVERYBODY: AN INTRODUCTION TO
JAMES JOYCE FOR THE ORDINARY READER).
The author served as a deckhand on F/V Kimberly Ann in 1996. The vessel was
registered to Anacortes, Washington, but worked mostly out of Alitak, Alaska.
The author wishes to thank Jon Gattinella for recruiting him to work on the F/V
Kimberly Ann.
JAMES JOYCE, GIACOMO JOYCE 44 (1968).
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If a reader is looking for a sunnily disposed travelogue or the
happy tales of times in Italy, the reader should look elsewhere.12 Joyce
gave us things as they were, and one can see how he could speak to a
fisherman who picked him up only because the pornographic comic
books no longer entertained him. We might speculate that this is
precisely the audience that Joyce would have appreciated.
III. THE CENSORS AND THE DAWN OF FIRST AMENDMENT
JURISPRUDENCE
Victorian censors who fancied themselves defenders of “the
culture” or faith did not want Joyce’s version of reality in the
marketplace of ideas. Joyce may have been radical but the concept of
book burning was not. Cries for censorship were not rare in “the land
of the free,” 13 despite the inspiring language presented by the First
Amendment.
Despite a history of imperfect application of the principles
enshrined in the First Amendment, Anglo-American jurisprudence has
drifted in fits and starts toward an ever-expanding view of freedom of
expression.14 From pre-colonial John Milton15 to post-colonial British

12

13

14

Vapid and vacuous descriptions of Italy are easy to find. For a more saccharine
view of the country, see e.g., FRANCES MAYES, UNDER THE TUSCAN SUN: AT
HOME IN ITALY (Chronicle Books 1996); ELIZABETH GILBERT, EAT PRAY LOVE
(2007).
Early in American history, before the revolution, John Peter Zenger was arrested
for seditious libel in New York after publishing a newspaper containing articles
critical of the government. Though Zenger was eventually acquitted—by a jury
essentially ignoring their instructions—U.S. founders and leaders for a long time
followed the trend of punishing anyone criticizing the government. The 1798
Alien and Sedition Acts—though containing a “truth” exception—resulted in the
convictions of James Callendar (Callendar wrote a book critical of the president,
calling him a “gross hypocrite”), Mathew Lyon (a congressman who had wrote a
critical journal article), Benjamin Bache (a newspaper publisher), and many
others. For an extensive list and description of these suppressive decisions see,
Gordon T. Belt, Sedition Act of 1798 – a brief history of arrests, indictments,
mistreatment & abuse, FIRST AMENDMENT CTR., http://www.first
amendmentcenter.org/madison/wpcontent/uploads/2011/03/Sedition_Act_
cases.pdf (last visited Apr. 2, 2016).
U.S. courts are inclined to approve and enlarge protection of political and
commercial speech yet courts continue to be closeted over erotic speech.
Compare Citizens United v. Federal Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 370 (2010)
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author John Stuart Mill 16 to Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes, Anglo-American philosophy has a history of favoring the
marketplace of ideas. Justice Holmes was the first to bless this theory
in his 1919 dissent to Abrams v. United States,17 where he wrote what
may be the most influential passage in American legal history:
Persecution for the expression of opinions seems to me
perfectly logical. If you have no doubt of your premises
or your power, and want a certain result with all your
heart, you naturally express your wishes in law, and
sweep away all opposition. To allow opposition by
speech seems to indicate that you think the speech
impotent, as when a man says that he has squared the
circle, or that you do not care wholeheartedly for the
result, or that you doubt either your power or your
premises.
But when men have realized that time has upset many
fighting faiths, they may come to believe even more
than they believe the very foundations of their own
conduct that the ultimate good desired is better reached
by free trade in ideas – that the best test of truth is the
power of the thought to get itself accepted in the
competition of the market, and that truth is the only
ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried
out.
That, at any rate, is the theory of our Constitution. It is
an experiment, as all life is an experiment. Every year,
if not every day, we have to wager our salvation upon

15

16

17

(holding that corporate funding of political advertisements for candidate
elections is protected under the First Amendment) with United States v. Extreme
Assoc., Inc., 431 F.3d 150, 151 (3d Cir. 2005) (indictment for producing obscene
pornography).
See e.g., JOHN MILTON, AREOPAGITICA (Edward Arber, ed., London, 1869)
(1644).
See e.g., JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (Longmans, Green, and Co., 1867);
CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT (Parker, Son, & Bourn,
1861).
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 624–31 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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some prophecy based upon imperfect knowledge. While
that experiment is part of our system, I think that we
should be eternally vigilant against attempts to check
the expression of opinions that we loathe and believe to
be fraught with death, unless they so imminently
threaten immediate interference with the lawful and
pressing purposes of the law that an immediate check is
required to save the country.18
With that, Oliver Wendell Holmes opened the clouds and let the
sun shine in. Strangely enough, this passage was the losing side of a
debate. The majority opinion sustained the convictions of five men
who were prosecuted under the Espionage Act of 1917. Their crime
was that they distributed a series of pamphlets calling for worker
solidarity in resisting the war effort. 19 The court held that “the
language of these circulars was obviously intended to provoke and to
encourage resistance to the United States in the war.”20 In other words,
core political speech.
Holmes’s dissent was remarkable in a vacuum, but downright
shocking in light of his views as the author of majority opinions just
months prior in which he justified and supported censorship. In
Schenck v. United States, 21 and Debs v. United States, 22 Holmes
supported silencing voices of political dissent. However, in the
intervening months, Holmes reflected upon his position and changed
his mind, thus changing his own legacy forever.23 This is all the more
remarkable, in that dissenting opinions carry no legal weight at all.
Nevertheless, they can occasionally persuade and influence later cases,
and Holmes’s dissent in Abrams is the greatest example of this
phenomenon, as his dissent has become the law of the land, unlikely to
be dislodged.

18
19
20
21
22
23

Id. at 630.
Id. at 624.
Id.
249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
249 U.S. 211, 215-16 (1919).
See generally THOMAS HEALY, THE GREAT DISSENT: HOW OLIVER WENDELL
HOLMES CHANGED HIS MIND—AND CHANGED THE HISTORY OF FREE SPEECH IN
AMERICA (Metropolitan Books, 2013).
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Holmes’s dissent in Abrams was the dawn of free expression in the
United States. Before that, the First Amendment was a forgotten
amendment, much like the Third Amendment is today. 24 But, on
November 10, 1919, Holmes gave birth to modern First Amendment
thought. As a mere single member’s dissent, it was a sickly infant,
whose likelihood of survival beyond that day was far from likely,
much less certain.
Meanwhile, at about the time that the free expression sun was
rising in America, so was a vicious bora25 of censorship. This desire to
clamp down on artistic expression grew from the mentality of
Victorian times, sexual repression, and a bizarre interpretation of
“morality,” which its adherents pressed in every corner with
evangelical fervor. 26 This mentality has ebbed and flowed over the

24

25

26

The Third Amendment prohibits the government from quartering troops in
private homes. U.S. Const. amend. III. Aside from a few notable cases, this
amendment is rarely mentioned in case law, as the issue simply rarely arises in
modern times. See, e.g., Engblom v. Carey, 677 F.2d 957, 963 (2d Cir. 1982)
(holding that prison staff had an interest in protecting their property against
quartering of state National Guardsmen under the Third Amendment); Mitchell
v. City of Henderson, No. 2:13-cv-01154-APG-CWH, 2015 WL 427835, at *18
(D. Nev. Feb. 2, 2015) (holding that municipal police officers are not “soldiers”
under the Third Amendment).
The “bora” is a cold, dry, and gusty wind that famously blows through Trieste
during the winter months. See Wind of the World: Bora-Weather UK,
WEATHERONLINE, http://www.weatheronline.co.uk/reports/wind/The-Bora.htm
(last visited April 2, 2016).
While his crusade might seem to be a thing of the past, we can still find his
intellectual disciples in the relatively recent past. Edwin Meese, U.S. Attorney
General under Ronald Reagan; John Ashcroft, U.S. Attorney General under
George W. Bush; Mary Beth Buchanan, U.S. Attorney for the Western District
of Pennsylvania from 2001 to 2009; Alberto Gonzalez, U.S. Attorney General
under George W. Bush in 2005; and Brent Ward, U.S. Attorney for the District
of Utah from 1981-1988, were all Comstockists with “morality enforcement” at
the top of their lists of priorities. See Anthony Comstock’s Influence, CASE W.
RES. UNIV., http://www.case.edu/affil/skuyhistcontraception/online2012/
Comstock.html (last visited June 22, 2015); see also Edwin McDowell, Some
Say Meese Report Rates an ‘X’, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 21, 1986),
http://www.nytimes.com/1986/10/21/books/some-say-meese-report-rates-anx.html (discussing the “Final Report of the Attorney General’s Commission on
Pornography,” which concluded there was a “causal relationship” between
certain kinds of pornography and acts of violence); EDWIN MEESE III, THE
MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF REPUBLICAN GOVERNMENT, IN STILL THE LAW OF THE
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years, but the modern view of expression and the vision of the
morality censors were set to clash the moment that Ulysses landed in
the Americas.
In that clash, the marketplace of ideas itself was the title belt.
Ulysses was an unwitting contestant in such a bout. Joyce himself did
not seem to seek the fight out, and he was certainly ill equipped to pay
for it. At the same time, Joyce was not exactly likely to subscribe to
laissez-faire principles like the marketplace of ideas.27

27

LAND? 63-78 (Joseph S. McNamara ed. 1987) (“It is this venting of the moral
concerns of a people that is the very essence of political life. In a popular form
of government it is not only legitimate but essential that the people have the
opportunity to give full vent to their moral sentiments.”); Robert D. Richards &
Clay Calvert, Symposium: Sexually Explicit Speech: Prosecuting Obscenity
Cases: An Interview With Mary Beth Buchanan, 9 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 56
(discussing Buchanan’s commitment to prosecuting obscenity cases); Neil A.
Lewis, A Prosecution Tests the Definition of Obscenity, N.Y. Times (Sep. 28,
2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/28/us/28obscene.html?_r=0
(discussing six felony obscenity-related charges against Karen Fletcher, brought
by Mary Beth Buchanan, for operating a Web site called Red Rose, which
featured detailed fictional accounts of the molesting, torture, and sometimes
gruesome murders of children under the age of ten, mostly girls); Vicki
Haddock, Son of a Preacher Man / How John Ashcroft’s Religion Shapes His
Public Services, SF GATE (Aug. 4, 2002), http://www.sfgate.com/opinion/
article/Son-of-a-Preacher-Man-How-John-Ashcroft-s-2787948.php (discussing
how Ashcroft’s religious background influences his policies and service as
Attorney General); Jake Tapper, Justice Department Targets Porn Industry,
ABC NEWS (Aug. 28, 2004), http://abcnews.go.com/WNT/story?id=129480&
page=1 (“‘Obscenities have always been a priority of the attorney general,’ said
Mary Beth Buchanan, U.S. attorney for western Pennsylvania. ‘[A]nd [President
Bush] has asked each U.S. attorney to make that our priority as well.’”); Barton
Gellman, Recruits Sought for Porn Squad, WASH. POST (Sept. 20, 2005),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2005/09/19/AR2005091
901570.html (discussing the FBI’s recruiting for an anti-obscenity squad under
the Bush Administration, directed by Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales,
who described the initiative as “one of the top priorities”); Max Blumenthal, The
Porn Plot Against Prosecutors, NATION (Mar. 20, 2007), http://www.the
nation.com/article/porn-plot-against-prosecutors/ (discussing U.S. Attorney
Brent Ward’s federal anti-pornography campaign and crusade against
pornography during the Reagan era, as well as his return to government as the
chief of the Justice Department’s Obscenity Prosecution Task Force, where his
main achievement was to prosecute the producer of Girls Gone Wild).
The “marketplace of ideas” is a laissez-faire philosophy suggesting that, over
time, wherein the competition of ideas and public discourse will result in truth
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A. Comstock
The chief American anti-obscenity crusader, Anthony Comstock,
was born in 1844 to a Congregationalist mother. Comstock followed in
his mother’s religious footsteps after her death, when Comstock was
ten, and “rationalized that abstinence from all impure thoughts and
behaviors secured the faithful path to righteousness.”28 Not only did
Comstock subject himself to this rationalization, but he also insisted
on persecuting all others who did not follow this path. He challenged
tobacco and alcohol use, gambling, and atheism within the military
during his stretch as a Union soldier in the Civil War and later began
his attack on the “commercialized sex industry.” 29 The 1873 Act,
named after Comstock, forbade any distribution or discussion of
contraceptives. 30 Later the Comstock Act was amended to include
punishment for producing “obscene, lewd, or lascivious” writings. In
his final court case, against Margaret Sanger’s Family Limitation,
Comstock noted, “If some of these women who go around advocating
Woman Suffrage would go around and advocate women having
children, they would be rendering society a greater service.” 31
Comstock ended his personal crusade with a few dedicated followers
who would later test the bounds of obscenity law against Ulysses.
The fight to ban Ulysses brought these cultures to a clash—and in
challenging the Victorian-Comstock censors, Joyce’s supporters, and
indeed Joyce scholars, lined up on the side of liberty.32 Ulysses is the

28
29
30

31
32

and effective political representation, though it is not truly connected to any type
of economic notion. See, e.g., Stanley Ingber, The Marketplace of Ideas: A
Legitimizing Myth, 1984 DUKE L.J. 1 (1984). Joyce was more concerned about a
stubborn publication of his version of the truth no matter its effect. See generally
KEVIN BIRMINGHAM, THE MOST DANGEROUS BOOK (2014).
Anthony Comstock’s Influence, supra note 26.
Id.
See generally Robert Corn-Revere, New Age Comstockery, 4 COMMLAW
CONSPECTUS 173, 175 (1996).
Anthony Comstock’s Influence, supra note 26.
While we review these concepts against the backdrop of Ulysses, the reader will
likely be incapable of considering the remainder of this Article without
pondering more modern forms of censorship—be they state sponsored or acts of
terrorism. On January 7, 2015, Charlie Hebdo cartoonists and employees Jean
Cabut, Stephane Charbonnier, Philippe Honore, Bernard Verlhac, Georges
Wolinski, Elsa Cayat, Frederic Boisseau, Bernard Maris, Mustapha Ourrad,
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point at which Holmes’s theory takes hold beyond a small bit of “core”
protected speech, and the real promise of the First Amendment truly
begins to mean something to everyone—not just those engaged in selfgovernance, but those who simply wish for a culture free of shackles
placed upon it by the few, to promote a narrow view of morality.
B. Ulysses: Obscene?
Ulysses evokes a “somewhat tragic and very powerful commentary
on the inner lives of men and women,” and yet has been the subject of
much disrepute with regard to its depiction of the “way people actually
spoke and what people actually thought and did during a typical
day.”33 Ulysses is “obscene” by one inaccurate meaning of the word,
“that it deals frankly with behavior, habits and actions which in life are
generally private.”34 One may find it strange that the “typical day” of a
person could be judged as unfit for the eyes or ears of anyone. In fact,
if Ulysses is “obscene” then “then life is obscene.”35
In the late 1800s and early 1900s, books like Joyce’s Ulysses were
deemed obscene. The book was banned in the United States, England,

33
34

35

Michel Renaud, as well as two French police officers, were gunned down by
terrorists in response to satirical publications depicting and criticizing the
Prophet Muhammad and Islam. Charlie Hebdo Attack: Police Hunt Suspects
North of Paris, BBC (Jan. 8, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe30734762. Later in May 2015, Anata Bijoy Das, a blogger advocating for a
secular government and rationalism, was attacked and killed in Bangladesh. See
Marc Randazza, Why You Should Speak Up for Slain Blogger, CNN (May 12,
2015), http://www.cnn.com/2015/05/12/opinions/randazza-bangladeshi-bloggerdaskilled/index. html.
BIRMINGHAM, supra note 27, at 13.
5 May (1958): Henry Miller to James Laughlin, AM. READER (Apr. 7, 2016),
http://theamericanreader.com/5-may-1958-henry-miller-to-james-laughlin/;
Joseph L. Featherstone, Critics Testify for ‘Tropic of Cancer’, HARV. CRIMSON,
http://www.thecrimson.com/article/1961/9/27/critics-testify-for-tropic-ofcancer/ (last visited Apr. 7, 2016).
5 May (1958): Henry Miller to James Laughlin, This Day in Lettres, AM.
READER, http://theamericanreader.com/5-may-1958-henry-miller-to-jameslaughlin/ (last visited Apr. 11, 2016) (describing Henry Moore’s testimony in
Attorney General v. Book Named “Tropic of Cancer”, 345 Mass. 11 (1962).
Harry T. Moore testified that Tropic of Cancer’s “seamier passages reflect the
life of real people. . . . If this book is obscene, then life is obscene.” The same
can certainly be said for Ulysses, and James Joyce was clearly aware of the
reflection of real life he had depicted. See BIRMINGHAM, supra note 27.
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Ireland, Canada, and Australia.36 The U.S. and Ireland lifted their bans
in 1934, England lifted its in 1936, and Canada retained its ban until
1949. 37 Nevertheless, Ulysses staged a coup that would result in
critical changes to obscenity laws in many countries, and the banning
likely contributed to the book’s popularity.38
C. Obscenity in the United States: One Book Called Ulysses
Major developments in United States obscenity law came into play
just in time to stifle Ulysses. In 1873, Comstock began his Post Office
vendetta against the consumers of “obscene” literature. 39 Comstock
devoted his life to defending the world from the plague of
“immorality,” from contraceptives to works of art. In addition to
Ulysses, Comstock went after all forms of sexual education, nude
paintings by French modern artists, and even George Bernard Shaw’s
play Mrs. Warren’s Profession. 40 Ulysses was not getting past the
morality “crusader” who even expressed disgust at the language used
by his military peers and the literature read by fellow workers in the
dry goods store he worked in after the Civil War. Once, Comstock
even boasted that he had convicted more than 3,000 41 people and

36
37
38
39

40

41

VANDERHAM, supra note 1.
Id. at 5.
See BIRMINGHAM, supra note 27, at 212, 305–06.
Despite the ban and the Post Office’s guidance by Comstock’s reign of literary
terror, U.S. customs officials often allowed the book through without a fuss. In
fact, Earnst was almost unable to bring the Ulysses I case because customs failed
to enforce the ban without excessive persuasion. On the other hand, “in England,
the Home Office did everything in its power to stop the circulation of Ulysses
short of a criminal prosecution, which it avoided only because a trial would give
the book more publicity.” English authorities prevented the book from entering
the country and tracked down the named recipient to notify them that the book
was found and confiscated. Even the U.S. Postal Service, save for a few
Comstockians, was not that motivated. Birmingham, supra note 27, at 305–06,
262–63.
Margaret A. Blanchard, The American Urge to Censor: Freedom of Expression
Versus the Desire to Sanitize Society—From Anthony Comstock to 2 Live Crew,
33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 741, 758 (1992).
“In the forty-one years I have been here I have convicted persons enough to fill
a passenger train of sixty-one coaches, sixty coaches containing sixty passengers
each and the sixty-first almost full.” James C.N. Paul & Murray L. Schwartz,
Federal Censorship: Obscenity in the Mail, HARV. L. REV. 1 (1962). I am not
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destroyed “160 tons of obscene literature.”42 History has not been kind
to Comstock, but I would argue that it has not been cruel enough.
Ulysses was officially banned from the United States on February
21, 1921, with the convictions of Margaret Anderson and Jane Heap,
the original U.S. publishers.43 The defense began the debate over what
“obscenity” and “literary value” meant. 44 It was the first link to
looking at a potentially obscene literary work as a whole.45 Prior to the
Ulysses case, obscenity was a piecemeal analysis, leaving the value of
a work on the sidelines, as censors picked apart the text for
uncomfortable passages. Naturally, this was only for disfavored works,
as one could imagine picking apart the Holy Bible, and but for the
context, there are some pretty racy parts in it.46
At the time of Ulysses I, “obscene” in the United States meant
anything “tending to stir the sex impulses or lead to sexually impure
and lustful thoughts.” 47 This was not exactly American ingenuity.

42
43
44
45

46

47

entirely convinced he did that math correctly but would not be surprised if he
kept a tally.
Id. at 1683.
BIRMINGHAM, supra note 27 at 191–198.
Id. at 304.
See United States v. One Book Called “Ulysses” (“Ulysses I”), 5 F. Supp. 182,
183 (S.D.N.Y. 1933).
“Found in nearly every home within the reach of underage children in a book
plump with lecherous scenes normally confined to the sin-bins marked ‘Adults
Only.’” BEN E. AKERLEY, THE X-RATED BIBLE: AN IRREVERENT SURVEY OF
SEX IN THE SCRIPTURES 7, 216 (1999). Examples include: “And it came to pass
on the morrow, that the firstborn said unto the younger, behold, I lay yesternight
with my father: let us make him drink wine this night also; and go thou in, and
lie with him, that we may preserve seed of our father.” Genesis 19:30–36
(referring to the story of Lot’s two daughters getting him drunk, sleeping with
him, and later bearing his children); and “My beloved put his hand by the hole
of the door, and my bowels were moved for him. Thy statute is like a palm tree,
and thy breasts are clusters of grapes.” SONG OF SOLOMON 5:4, 7:6-9 (relaying
the story of their intercourse, Solomon’s—notably black—wife describes
Solomon’s obsession with her breasts).
Id. Again, this could mean even the Bible, but given that the censors usually
derived their moral authority from it, the Bible seemed to be exempt. And
granted its broad coverage, obscenity law, even at the time, could have alluded
to much more. For instance, in Canada, obscenity law covered general
obscenity, not simply sexual aberrance. The early 1892 obscenity statute in
Canada “made it an offence to offer for sale ‘any obscene book, or other printed
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With a relatively young judiciary and a common law tradition,
Americans simply imported the logic from the 1868 U.K. case Regina
v. Hicklin.48 The Hicklin test for obscenity was “whether the tendency
of the matter charged as obscenity is to deprave and corrupt those
whose minds are open to such immoral influences and into whose
hands a publication of this sort may fall.”49 It focused on the effect the
allegedly obscene article had on the most corruptible readers and not
on the book’s actual contents. A judge merely had to imagine a
hypothetical scenario where someone (unlike himself, of course) could
be corrupted by the work. Despite this test, Morris Ernst, the U.S.
attorney who defended Ulysses, challenged the court to determine that
a book could corrupt innocent minds.50
Judge Woolsey, in Ulysses I, did not only accept Ernst’s argument
that a book could not corrupt the minds of most readers, but also took
the first major step away from the Hicklin rule. At the outset of the
opinion, Woolsey stated that the book is not simple to read nor
understand, and a “jury trial would have been an extremely
unsatisfactory, if not an almost impossible method of dealing with
it.” 51 He pointed out that Joyce’s writing depicts the day of lower
middle class citizens of Dublin, detailing what they do, say, think, and
imagine. The Hicklin standard is easily read to conclude that many of
the things Joyce details in the normal lives of people could be deemed
obscene. Woolsey held that because the book looked at everyday lives,
there could not truly be anything bannable because people commonly
experience, or at least poor Dubliners experienced, the events Ulysses
detailed.52

48
49
50
51

52

or written matter, or any picture, photograph, model or other object, tending to
corrupt morals,’” but declined to provide a precise definition of obscenity. See
Canada Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1982, c 163; L.W. SUMNER, THE HATEFUL AND
THE OBSCENE: STUDIES IN THE LIMITS OF FREE EXPRESSION 12 (Toronto 2004).
Thus, it is understandable that Canada would be the last country to release the
ban of Ulysses if it applied the statutory definition of obscenity including
anything “disgusting or repugnant.”
Regina v. Hicklin, L.R. 2 Q.B. 360 (1868).
Id. at 369.
BIRMINGHAM, supra note 27, at 168–70.
United States v. One Book Called “Ulysses” (“Ulysses I”), 5 F. Supp. 182, 183
(S.D.N.Y. 1933).
Id.
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Woolsey also made the unusual comment for the time that those
who do not like allegedly obscene content can simply look away.53
This idea contradicts the Hicklin rule, as well as many of the obscenity
tests following it. Woolsey felt that simply “turning away” is an
appropriate option. But, even modern obscenity law does not take this
position.54 Woolsey also added that the book in question must be read
and assessed for obscenity in its entirety. The opinion grants this
assessment casually and seems to limit it to only books; “in its
entirety, as a book must be [read].” 55 Thus, either Woolsey truly
thought that books deserved a reading of the whole text, or he found a
large loophole through which to bring many “obscene” books.
Upon appeal, in Ulysses II,56 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
not only upheld Woolsey’s decision, but also laid the foundation for
the now-prevailing (in the United States) Miller standard and distanced
American law from Hicklin. Indeed, as the dissent suggested, the court
did not make an effort to uphold Hicklin at all.57 The appellate court
broadened Woolsey’s logic and paved the way for new analysis,
stating:
[I]t is settled, at least so far as this court is concerned,
that works of physiology, medicine, science, and sex
instruction are not within the statute, though to some
extent and among some persons they may tend to
promote lustful thoughts. We think the same immunity
should apply to literature as to science, where the
presentation, when viewed objectively, is sincere, and

53

54

55
56

57

See id. at 184. “If one does not wish to associate with such folk as Joyce
describes, that is one’s own choice. In order to avoid indirect contact with them
one may not wish to read ‘Ulysses,’ that is quite understandable.” Id.
After being arrested and prosecuted for distribution and production of obscenity,
Robert Ziccari said “The funny thing about my business is I don’t force it on
anybody. The only people that are going to be forced to watch my movies are
the 12 people that sit on that jury.” Jake Tapper, Justice Department Targets
Porn Industry, ABC (Aug. 28, 2003), http://abcnews.go.com/WNT/story?id
=129480.
One Book Called “Ulysses”, 5 F. Supp. at 185.
United States v. One Book Entitled Ulysses, 72 F.2d 705, 706 (2d Cir. 1934)
(“Ulysses II”).
72 F.2d at 709 (Manton, J., dissenting).
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the erotic matter is not introduced to promote lust and
does not furnish the dominant note of the publication.58
This four-tiered analysis was not necessary to rule Ulysses nonobscene. Woolsey had already established that Ulysses was an
inaccessible work about ordinary lives. Yet the Second Circuit found it
necessary to further develop an exception for literary works. The way
the court phrased its reasoning for a literary exception highlights how
impossible it is to apply obscenity law with any consistency. An
average person may be sexually aroused by any number of factors,
including by a scientific text, as the court reasoned.59
The dissent in Ulysses II argued that “the object of the use of the
obscene words was not a subject for consideration,” meaning that the
book as a whole is divorced from the effect a given passage has on its
readers.60 Under the Hicklin test, the whole of Ulysses being about the
lives of Dubliners would not matter if merely one section evoked
lustful thoughts.
D. Roth v. United States
Even after Ulysses, Hicklin remained partially intact. But the
reasoning from Ulysses I & II entered the jurisprudential DNA and
started to make subtle changes. Following Ulysses, Roth v. United
States61 took the lead as a key obscenity case. That case involved two
persons convicted for selling obscene books. The Court again held that
the First Amendment did not protect obscene speech on the rationale
that the Constitution was intended to “assure unfettered interchange of
ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by
the people.”62 The Roth court saw these “political and social changes”
to be separate from changes in acceptance of sexual material. The
Court reasoned that this was never going to be a change civilized
society would desire. 63 There seemed to be a judicial position that

58
59
60
61
62
63

Id. at 707 (internal citation omitted).
Id. at 706-07.
Id. at 709.
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
Id. at 484.
Id.
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Victorian sexual mores were there to stay, and no amount of
discussion would change that.
Despite Hicklin’s continued influence, the Court noted that “all
ideas having even the slightest redeeming social importance—
unorthodox ideas, controversial ideas, even ideas hateful to the
prevailing climate of opinion—have the full protection of the
guaranties [of the First Amendment].”64 “But implicit in the history of
the First Amendment is the rejection of obscenity as utterly without
redeeming social importance.” 65 The question then becomes: If
obscenity cannot have redeeming social importance, then are all things
with redeeming social importance not obscene? Or if obscene things
contain any social importance, does the social importance become
moot upon it being held obscene? In light of Ulysses, one would think
the former view would prevail—and this concept is the key to the gift
to freedom of expression that the Ulysses cases represent.
Though the Roth court followed Hicklin, it criticized the Hicklin
test for its potential to stifle protected speech about sex. This criticism
hints that literature should be excluded in some cases as some material,
though sexual, is sufficiently interesting to the marketplace of ideas to
warrant protection. 66 To uphold these standards, voiced earlier in
Ulysses II, the court created a new test. Roth modified the obscenity
test to ask “whether to the average person, applying contemporary
community standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a
whole appeals to prurient interest.” 67 The impact of the potentially
obscene material was measured against the present-day standards of
the “[a]verage person in the community” that the material was likely to
reach.68 Here, the Court followed the Ulysses I reasoning that not only
will there be people not wanting to access the work at issue, but those
who access it may not even understand it, let alone be offended by it.69

64
65
66
67
68
69

Id.
Id.
Id. at 489.
Id.
Id.
Cf. United States v. One Book Called “Ulysses” (“Ulysses I”), 5 F. Supp. 182,
184 (S.D.N.Y. 1933). Ulysses is a work that stresses incapacity for
understanding. If a child were likely to access the book they would not
understand what it contained. Similarly, for an obscene mailing, a child who
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Since this standard is so malleable, the defendants in Roth argued
that it did not provide a reasonably ascertainable standard of guilt or
predictability. The court dismissed this argument, stating that “the
thrust of the argument is that these words are not sufficiently precise
because they do not mean the same thing to all people, all the time
everywhere,” while determining that the test “conveys sufficiently
definite warning.”70
Justices Douglas and Black dissented in Roth, noting that
convictions based on “purity of thought which a book or tract instills
in the mind of the reader” were unfaithful to the meaning of the First
Amendment, especially since sexual thoughts are a daily occurrence.71
The dissent cited a research questionnaire that asked college-age
women what “things were most stimulating sexually.” Answers varied
from dancing to theater to men in general. 72 Clearly, the dissent
pointed out, the test based on a community standard is “community
censorship in one of its worst forms.”73
Indeed, even Justice Harlan’s concurrence questioned the extent of
obscenity restrictions. Citing Ulysses II, Harlan noted that the question
of the case only involved the constitutionality of the statute and not the
“correctness of the definition of ‘obscenity.’”74 He noted that though a
jury could easily find a book like Ulysses obscene, the conviction of
someone for selling it would raise “the gravest constitutional
problems.” 75 The court must make independent judgments when
determining obscenity, which can often cause material with
“redeeming social importance” to fall outside the First Amendment’s
protection.76

70
71
72
73

74
75
76

would not normally access the mailing likely would not understand the mailing
upon receipt.
Roth, 354 U.S. at 491.
Id. at 508.
Id. at 509.
Id. at 512. Despite this language, the dissent still argues that “no one would
suggest that the First Amendment permits nudity in public places, adultery, and
other phases of sexual misconduct.” Id.
Roth, 354 U.S. at 499 (Harlan, J., concurring).
Id. at 498.
See Roth, 354 U.S. at 495 (Warren, J., concurring).
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Later, in Jacobellis v. Ohio, the Supreme Court attempted to
reconcile the concerns over a community standards test.77 As we saw
in Ulysses I & II, such standards are difficult to establish when
assessing access, understanding, and degree of offensiveness.
Jacobellis dealt with convictions for possession and showing of
obscene films. The court found that the movie, a French love story,
was not obscene and that the test’s “contemporary community
standards” must be interpreted as the standards of society as a whole,
rather than a local community. 78 A test relying on local standards
would cause distributors to be wary about selling anything that could
be remotely thought of as obscene, for fear of conviction in an
especially conservative community.
Again, the Jacobellis dissent sounded the same worries of the
dissent in Ulysses II. The government seeks “to maintain a decent
society and, on the other hand, the right of individuals to express
themselves freely in accordance with the guarantees of the First and
Fourteenth Amendments,” and so the dissent argued that the phrase
“community standards” should mean “community,” not national,
standards.79 Justice Stewart, in his concurrence, pointed out the nighunworkable vagaries of the Roth obscenity standard and famously
stated that while he could not develop a concise definition of the term
hard-core pornography, “I know it when I see it.”80
In a related case, A Book Named “John Cleland’s Memoirs of a
Woman of Pleasure” v. Massachusetts, the Court sought to clarify this
“redeeming social importance” standard. 81 In Memoirs, the Court
clarified that, to be deemed obscene, a book must be “utterly without
redeeming social value.”82 This was in opposition to the lower court’s
ruling that “some minimal literary value does not mean it is of any
social importance.”83

77
78
79
80
81

82
83

See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964).
Id. at 193.
Jacobellis, 378 U.S. at 199 (Warren, J., dissenting).
Id. at 197.
See A Book Named “John Cleland’s Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure” v.
Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 415 (1966).
Id. at 419.
Id. (quoting Attorney General v. Book Named “John Cleland’s Memoirs of a
Woman of Pleasure”, 206 N.E.2d 403, 406 (Mass. 1965).
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Again, in Memoirs, the Supreme Court upheld the Ulysses II dicta
that literary work should be granted similar immunity as scientific
materials. In Ulysses I, Woolsey did not attempt to impress upon his
audience that Ulysses maintained literary importance and social value
to all persons or even all possible readers. Yet, the social importance
of Joyce’s work—or of John Cleland’s works—to a few well-read
scholars is not a moot point, as dissenters would have you believe.
E. Stanley v. Georgia and Restricting Private Possession
The very slow move away from the Hicklin test continued in the
1969 case Stanley v. Georgia, where the Supreme Court held that the
First Amendment protected the private possession of obscene
materials.84 Indeed, if this were the law during the time of the Ulysses
trial, readers may have been saved. Perhaps a major purpose of one
deciding to read an “obscene” book is the secrecy and taboo-ness of
the matter—or simply because it challenges societal norms. With the
Postal Service strictly limiting access to Ulysses, reading it was a
challenge to be overcome—a forbidden fruit that was all the sweeter.
Without such a challenge Ulysses may not have gained such extensive
popularity.85
Stanley dealt with obscene films discovered during a search of the
defendant’s home for unrelated crimes. The Court seemed inclined to
address the First Amendment questions the case posed, though the
Court could have simply disposed of the case on the basis that the
government conducted an unconstitutional search and seizure. 86 The
government argued, “If the State can protect the body of a citizen, may
it not . . . protect his mind?” 87 The Court rejected this by finding a
fundamental right almost separate from the right of free speech in the
“right to receive information and ideas, regardless of their social

84
85

86

87

See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
The U.S. could have been quieter about its legal recourse against Ulysses, but
this does not mean that Ulysses would have been any less popular. Essentially
the only way for U.S. postal agents to make Ulysses less of a problem would
have been to not ban it in the first place.
See Stanley, 394 U.S. at 569 (1969). And again, how do you protect men’s
minds from their own lives? See supra text accompanying note 32.
Id. at 560.
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worth.” 88 Certainly after Ulysses, the government cannot begin to
think they can “control men’s minds.” Again, as in the Ulysses cases,
dissenters assume that the understanding is the same in all men’s
minds. At least the judges in Stanley learned somewhere in the time
since Ulysses that an “obscene” work may breed thoughts as far from
lustful as possible—sadness, contempt, anger, and the many other
feelings expressed by Ulysses readership over the years. The Stanley
court reconciled this issue by clarifying that the First Amendment
protects the right to speak as well as the right to receive speech.89
The Court stated, “Whatever may be the justifications for other
statutes regulating obscenity, we do not think they reach into the
privacy of one’s own home.” 90 This raises the question, then, of
whether there are grounds for regulating certain kinds of obscene
speech, but not others. After all, “[o]ur whole constitutional heritage
rebels at the thought of giving government the power to control men’s
minds.”91 The irony in the Stanley court’s pro-speech proclamations,
of course, is that the entire concept of obscenity law aims to control
men’s minds, especially under the original Hicklin standard. One
justification for such control is that “exposure to obscene materials
may lead to deviant sexual behavior or crime of sexual violence.”92
Showing a development in judicial thought diverging from puritanical
roots, the Stanley court noted that there is little evidence of a causal
connection between crime and obscene materials 93 —yet again
reaffirming the thought process of Judge Woolsey and fellow Ulysses
readers.
Though Stanley attempted to make a large leap away from obscene
speech restrictions—and to confirm Ulysses’ logic in the Supreme
Court arena—multiple cases following the decision have softened

88
89

90
91
92
93

Id. at 564.
See id. Note that Stanley does not refer to Ulysses, but its argument is backed by
the dissent and concurrence in Roth, which relies on the precedent set by
Ulysses.
Id. at 565.
Id.
Id. at 566.
Id. This same argument and rebuttal is consistently applied in debates
concerning the sale of violent video games, particularly when minors are
involved.
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Stanley’s blow to obscenity jurisprudence. For example, in Paris Adult
Theatre v. Slanton, the Supreme Court restricted the showing of
obscene films to consenting adults in private theaters 94 —thus again
reaffirming that obscenity law is in anticipation of the exact effect on
“men’s minds,” here especially on those who may not have known
what they were truly getting into.95 The appellant’s theater had posted
signs noting that the films screened contained nudity, and minors were
refused entry. 96 The Court insisted that in addition to protecting
minors, restrictions on obscene articles was necessary to “[stem] the
tide of commercialized obscenity” and to maintain the quality of life of
the community because such material may risk public safety and
increase crime. People have some freedom of choice in the materials
they view, the Court reasoned, but the government must have a way to
protect the “gullible from the exercise of their own volition.”97 Paris
holds that preventing obscene speech from entering the hands of
willing participants is an appropriate way to achieve these goals. But it
is an idiotic and disgraceful decision and a slap in the face of Ulysses
precedent.
In another case, Osborne v. Ohio, the Supreme Court ruled that
Stanley did not apply when dealing with statutes restricting possession
of child pornography. 98 Child pornography is probably when
censorship is most permissible, but even in these circumstances the
dissenting justices in Osborne were willing to uphold the individual
right to possess pornography by applying the overbreadth doctrine.99

94
95

96

97
98
99

See 413 U.S. 49 (1973).
See generally id. I’m sure it’s possible that with the rarity of adult film theaters
in the 1970s that some “consenting” adults may have stumbled on a sexual scene
they did not readily anticipate, yet what is one assuming “adult content” entails
if not sex? I suppose murder, coveting your neighbor’s front lawn, and lying to
your parents could fall within the “adult” category for some (notably any
remaining Comstock progeny).
See id. at 52. Though the court did not hear any information of whether minors
had ever entered or tried to enter the theater.
Id. at 57–59.
Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 108 (1990).
Id. at 112 (internal quotation omitted). The Overbreadth doctrine permits
challenges to speech laws that are so over-regulatory—overbroad—that the law
criminalizes constitutionally protected conduct. “Where a statute regulates
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In the dissent’s view “the state [child pornography] law, even as
construed authoritatively by the Ohio Supreme Court, is still fatally
overbroad, and our decision in Stanley . . . prevents the State from
criminalizing appellant’s possession.”100 Justice Brennan here was not
advocating for child pornography, but rather was again pointing out
the fact that most obscenity laws cover protected speech and are thus
unconstitutional.
In light of this precedent we have seen the U.S. Supreme Court
swing back and forth in their respect for free expression when sexual
content is in play. At the core of these case holdings the Court is
inclined to favor Ulysses I & II but knows it runs the potential risk of
upsetting a society not yet prepared to handle the bowel movements of
Leopold Bloom, let alone the right of someone to make fictional
stories about child abusers.101
IV. MILLER V. CALIFORNIA: OBSCENITY TEST TODAY
The controlling legal standard for determining obscenity in the
United States today, the Miller test, finally codified the literary
exception proposed in Ulysses II. The case of Miller v. California102
dealt with mass mailings advertising “adult material” being considered
obscene.
The unsolicited mailings prominently showed explicit nude
drawings. Specifically, the Court noted that the States have a
significant interest in regulating such unsolicited mailings where “the
mode of dissemination carries with it a significant danger of offending
the sensibilities of unwilling recipients or of exposure to juveniles.”103
This reasoning is similar to the government’s basis for convicting
Anderson and Heap more than half a century earlier, which again has
been highly unconvincing since that conviction.104 The Court proposed
a new test for obscenity, where a finding of obscenity is determined

100
101
102
103
104

expressive conduct, the scope of the statute does not render it unconstitutional
unless its overbreadth is not only real but substantial.”
Osborne, 495 U.S. at 126 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
See infra note 106 (discussing the case of Karen Fletcher).
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 16-17 (1973).
Id. at 19.
BIRMINGHAM, supra note 27, at 192.
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by: 1) whether the average person applying contemporary community
standards (not national standards) 105 would find that the work as a
whole appeals to the prurient interest; 2) whether the work depicts or
describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct defined by
applicable state law; and 3) whether the work lacks serious literary,
artistic, political, or scientific value.106
The Miller test reaffirms and clarifies Roth, and overturns the
national standard rationale of Jacobellis and the “utterly without
socially redeeming value” standard in Memoirs. Most importantly, it
memorializes the importance of literary works acknowledged in
Ulysses II, where the court valiantly, unapologetically, and for the first
time, equated the importance of the literary mind with the importance
of scientific discovery and explanation.
V. CRITICISM BY THE LAITY
Vagueness, though a common criticism of most obscenity tests
including Miller, was not an issue in the case of Ulysses, as Joyce
himself and his publishers were well aware that the book was likely to

105

106

There have been other standards suggested in the United States and one even
introduced in Canada. As early as 1987, Canadian courts considered readership
in the assessment of the audience for allegedly obscene material. The Canadian
Supreme Court has also suggested “restrictions on expressive freedom must be
harm-based rather than morality-based.” Though such standards may not pose
the exact problems of the “community standard,” they continue to lack clarity
and “there is no good reason to think that the community’s level of tolerance
accurately tracks harmfulness.” SUMNER, supra note 47, at 125.
This standard is certainly better than the Hicklin test, but the literary, artistic,
political, or scientific value, though seemingly broad, is unpredictable as
applied. For example, in 2008 Karen Fletcher was prosecuted and later plead
guilty to six counts of distributing obscene materials online. Fletcher had posted
fictional stories on her website containing graphic descriptions of torture and
molestation of children. United States v. Fletcher, No. CR 06-329 (D. Penn.
2008). Despite the fact that U.S. courts usually refrain from finding obscenity in
text-only cases, Fletcher’s case was a prime opportunity for “obscenity”
opponents to obtain a conviction based on text alone. Fletcher’s agoraphobia
was a driving force behind her guilty pleading in lieu of trial. Paula Reed Ward,
Afraid of Public Trial, Author to Plead Guilty in Online Obscenity Case,
PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, (May 17, 2008), http://www.post-gazette.com/
frontpage/2008/05/17/Afraid-of-public-trial-author-to-plead-guilty-in-onlineobscenity-case/stories/200805170216.
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be banned under existing law—yet they chose to challenge it
nonetheless. Ernst’s victory was likely due to some combination of the
right judge, the right time, and general apathy regarding obscenity,
aside from those who vehemently believed anything with sexual
content
was
filth.
Decades after Anderson and Heap, Ulysses finally succeeded in
bringing about a sunrise in the struggle for a preferred position for
literature under U.S. obscenity law.
Nevertheless, without the literary exception, Ulysses and similar
works can, even under Miller, find themselves swallowed up by the
broad obscenity rules. As dissenters opined many times, without
making Holmes-level traction, “what causes one person to boil up in
rage over one pamphlet or movie may reflect only his neurosis, not
shared by others.”107 Yet even opinions in favor of lowered obscenity
restrictions indicate that judges often believe there is some type of
undefined obscene thing that society will never accept even in light of
changing social standards. For example, the Miller opinion states:
One can concede that the ‘sexual revolution’ of recent
years may have had useful byproducts in striking layers
of prudery from a subject long irrationally kept from
needed ventilation. But it does not follow that no
regulation of patently offensive ‘hard core’ materials is
needed or permissible; civilized people do not allow
unregulated access to heroin because it is a derivative
of medicinal morphine.108
Ulysses is a perfect example of the schizophrenic and erotophobic
nature of American attitudes toward obscenity. Back in the 1930s
when Ulysses I & II were decided, many citizens and judges would
think that “civilized” people do not allow unregulated access to
Joyce’s “filthy” literature. Yet today, most readers would be hardpressed to find shock in their hearts at a description of urination 109 or
the clever insult “mean bloody scut.”110 As Charles McGrath recently
put it:

107
108
109
110

Miller, 413 U.S. at 41.
Id. at 36.
JAMES JOYCE, ULYSSES 46 (1918).
Id. at 326.
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By the standards of today’s dirty books, Ulysses seems
pretty tame, and it’s hard to put yourself back in the
mind-set of those who took such strenuous offense in
the ‘20s, when the book was first published by the
heroic Sylvia Beach.111
Of course, some might not make it to the end to evaluate the work
as a whole. Even the most dedicated Joycean must admit that there is a
significant number of people who simply despise the work. In fact,
even Ezra Pound disapproved:
I think certain things simply bad writing, in this section.
Bad because you waste the violence. You use a stronger
word than you need, and this is bad art, just as any
needless superlative is bad art.112
The relative merit of Ulysses or lack thereof, however, is of no
centrality to this study. Is Joyce a genius, or is his writing just so many
more stools dropped by Leopold Bloom in exacting detail, as was
further criticized by Pound? 113 If anyone thinks that Ulysses is his
bawdiest work, his private letters to Nora Barnacle truly reveal him in
all his glory.
My sweet little whorish Nora I did as you told me, you
dirty little girl, and pulled myself off twice when I read
your letter. I am delighted to see that you do like being
fucked arseways. Yes, now I can remember that night
when I fucked you for so long backwards. It was the
dirtiest fucking I ever gave you, darling. My prick was

111

112

113

Charles McGrath, How Would ’Ulysses’ Be Received Today?, N.Y. TIMES
(June 9, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/14/books/review/how-wouldulysses-be-received-today.html.
Letter from Ezra Pound to James Joyce (Mar. 29, 1918), http://www.the
parisreview.org/blog/2015/06/16/down-where-the-asparagus-grows. (The letter
also states: “If we are suppressed too often we’ll be suppressed finally and for
all, to the damn’d stoppage of all our stipends. AND I can’t have our august
editress jailed, NOT at any rate for a passage which I do not think written with
utter maestria.”).
“The contrast between Blooms interior poetry and his outward surroundings is
excellent, but it will come up without such detailed treatment of the dropping
feces.” See id.
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stuck in you for hours, fucking in and out under your
upturned rump.114
I question whether many of us would set Joyce up with our sisters,
but this is definitely a man that I would like to drink whiskey with.
If the reader has a problem with that, the reader is free to cast this
Article to the ground, or line his bird cage with it, burn it, or wipe his
ass with it. But, the reader has no liberty to force anyone else to read it.
As the Miller court recognized, “there is no ‘captive audience’
problem.”115 One is never forced to read Joyce. In fact, as recounted
earlier, someone tried to force the author with threats of a lifetime of
utter failure if he demurred. Obviously this was neither successful in
forcing the author to read it nor a prescient prediction.
If one could be forced to read Joyce, what would be the greater
sin? Forcing someone to read it, think about it, and consider its relative
merits, or depriving a hungry mind of the opportunity to do so? The
marketplace of ideas would suggest that a forced reading is of greater
value than no read at all. And, given that the marketplace of ideas
seems to continue to demand access to Joyce, those who wished to
keep it from the hands and minds of the willing have no intellectual
capital to spend there.
VI. THE JUDICIARY’S SHIFTING VIEW OF JOYCE
When one discusses the marketplace of ideas, one must be
prepared to find one’s own wares rejected. One measure of the work is
to review how it is mentioned in legal citations.
Almost immediately after the 1934 Ulysses II landmark case, the
judiciary seemed to embrace Joyce and Ulysses alike. Case after case
mentioned the decision. Then in 1975, one case became the first to
mention Joyce not in the context of obscenity law, but as an example
of bad writing.116 “Although the appellant in its brief, by arbitrarily
packaged passages reminiscent of the chapters in James Joyce’s
“Ulysses” recites in great factual detail a jury-type argument.” It
would not be until 1981 when such derision made its way into a

114

115
116

Letter from James Joyce to Nora Barnacle (1909), http://loveletters.
tribe.net/thread/fce72385-b146-4bf2-9d2e-0dfa6ac7142d.
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 16-17 (1973).
State Roads Comm’n v. Parker, 344 A.2d 109, 119 (Md. 1975).
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decision again, but the next time it would be even harsher. Brunwasser
v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.117 truly opened up on Joyce in an even
more indicting manner.
Allen N. Brunwasser’s pleadings contain a good bit of
this, and we are never certain whether we are reading
an attempted assertion of a legal claim, or some side
remark that popped into Brunwasser’s mind at the time.
But more than that, Brunwasser’s pleadings and briefs
reflect principally the style of the stream of
consciousness school, so popular in that generation.
We were able to understand dimly the action in
“Ulysses,” today it is explained by shelves of guides,
commentaries, companions and concordances. As
Joyce grew older he became more difficult and nobody
understood “Finnegan’s Wake” until the guides and
commentaries began to appear. No one supplies us with
guides to Brunwasser’s pleadings.
From that point forward, the prevailing judicial wind was to use
Joyce as an example of how not to write a brief or a law. In the 2012
case Catholic Health Initiatives Iowa, Corp. v. Sebelius, 118 Judge
Lamberth characterized the U.S. Medicare law as akin to “a law
written by James Joyce and edited by E.E. Cummings.” Such judicial
hyperbolic license is not itself troubling, but it is as if historians started
to mock Lafayette for speaking English with a French accent or for his
eating habits. Even worse, it would be as if historians not only focused
on the superficial elements of Lafayette’s personality, but did so while
ignoring his contributions to American independence.
With that, let us look at a limited overview of some cases
mentioning Joyce. As the reader can see, they begin with respect for
the decision, but as time goes on, the superficiality of judicial views on
Joyce becomes the prevailing view.
Holding that a book was
People v. Miller,
not obscene, the court cites
1935 155 Misc. 446
Citing
to Ulysses I & II to clarify
(D. N.Y. 1935)
that obscenity statues are

117
118

518 F. Supp. 1321, 1324 (W.D. Pa. 1981).
841 F. Supp. 2d 270, 271 (D.D.C. 2012).
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not meant to suppress
literary works.
Cases like Ulysses note a
People v.
change in popular attitudes
Larsen, 5
and a move for the law to
1938
Citing
N.Y.S.2d (N.Y. “avoid interference with
1938)
justifiable
freedom
of
expression.”
Uses Ulysses to say that
United States v. some sexual material may
Rebhuhn, 109
not be obscene per se
1940
Citing
F.2d 512 (S.D. because some people may
N.Y. 1940)
wish “seriously to study the
sexual practices.”
People v. Dial
Found book to be obscene
1944 Press, 182 Misc.
Citing
with use of Ulysses test.
416 (N.Y. 1944)
Stall v. State,
Found book to be obscene
1944 182 Misc. 416
Citing
with use of Ulysses test.
(N.Y. 1944)
People v.
Quoting Ulysses “nowhere
Vanguard Press, does it tend to be an
1947
Citing
192 Misc. 127 aphrodisiac” with regard to
(N.Y. 1947)
another non-obscene work.
“It should be noted at once
that the wording of section
Commonwealth
524 requires consideration
v. Gordon, 1949
of the indicted material as a
Pa. Dist. &
whole; it does not proscribe
1949 Cnty. Dec.
Citing
articles or publications that
LEXIS 242, *3merely contain obscene
4 (Pa. C.P.
matter. . . . United States v.
1949)
Ulysses, 72 F.(2d) 705
(1934).”
State v. Scope, 7
Uses Ulysses I standard for
1952 Terry 519
Citing
assessment as a whole.
(Delaware 1952)
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Supp. 823, 830
(D. Ohio 1953)
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The Ulysses case has been
recognized as the keystone
of the modern American
Citing
rule that indictable
obscenity must be “dirt for
dirt’s sake.”

Ulysses was banned under
unpredictable authority that
would pick and choose
Citing
which potentially obscene
literature to let in versus
which to ban.
Citing Ulysses to determine
Burke v.
that despite criticism of the
Kingsley Books,
1955
obscenity test a book Citing
208 Misc. 150
constituted dirt for dirt’s
(N.Y. 1955)
sake.
People v.
Richmond
Ulysses test for “dominant
1958 County News,
theme” of the work. Found Citing
13 Misc.2d 1068 magazine obscene.
(N.Y. 1958)
“The essence of the
Ulysses holding is that a
work of literary merit is not
obscene under federal law
merely because it contains
passages and language
dealing with sex in a most
Grove Press v.
candid and realistic fashion
Christenberry,
and uses many four-letter
1959 175 F. Supp 488
Citing
Anglo-Saxon words. Where
(S.D. N.Y.
a book is written with
1959)
honesty and seriousness of
purpose, and the portions
which might be considered
obscene are relevant to the
theme, it is not condemned
by the statute even though
it justly may offend many.”
Bantam Books
v. Melko, 25
1953 N.J.Super. 292
(N.J. Chancery
1953)
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Using the test from the
United States v. Ulysses cases (a book must
Head, 317 F.
be read in its entirety to
1970 Supp. 1138,
determine obscenity) to
1142 (E.D. La. find that an underground
1970)
newspaper was not
obscene.
Ulysses requires a
Sullivan v.
publication to be read as a
Houston
whole, and it does not
Independent
matter whether certain
1971 School Dist.,
portions are obscene even
333 F. Supp
in the context of student
1149 (S.D. Tx.
made materials distributed
1971)
in school.
The Court found that a
student magazine could not
be censored because it used
vulgar language. The court
used the fact that Ulysses
was required reading for
some of the college classes
(which contains all of the
Bazaar v.
“four-letter words” used in
Fortune, 476
1973
the magazine) and stated
F.2d 570 (5th
that Ulysses was a
Cir. 1973)
“recognized literary
masterpiece,” but also
distinguished the student
magazine in that the court
was not required to
determine if “this author
[had] as much literary merit
as a novel by James Joyce.”
“Although the appellant in
State Roads
its brief, by arbitrarily
Comm’n v.
packaged passages
1975 Parker, 275 Md. reminiscent of the chapters
651 (Maryland in James Joyce’s “Ulysses”
App. 1975)
recites in great factual
detail a jury-type
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Citing

Citing

Citing

Critical
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argument.”

Bloom v.
Municipal
1976
Court, 16 Cal.3d
71 (Cal. 1976)

Ulysses as an example of a
protected “soporific” work,
Citing
finding a state obscenity
law overbroad.
“[The Hicklin] test was
adopted by some American
courts but later decisions
have rejected it. United
States v. One Book Entitled
Ulysses, 72 F.2d 705 (2d
Cir. 1934) (rejected test
when government
attempted to prevent
Penthouse
circulation of James
International,
Joyce’s Ulysses in the
Ltd. v.
United States). In Ulysses,
1980 McAuliffe, 610
Citing
Judge Augustus Hand
F.2d 1353, 1367
found some parts of the
(5th Cir. Ga.
book to be obscene but
1980)
stated that it was not
obscene when ‘taken as a
whole.’ The Supreme Court
specifically rejected the
segmented approach of
Regina in Roth v. United
States, 354 U.S. 476, 77 S.
Ct. 1304, 1 L. Ed. 2d 1498
(1957).”
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“Allen N. Brunwasser’s
pleadings contain a good
bit of this, and we are never
certain whether we are
reading an attempted
assertion of a legal claim,
or some side remark that
popped into Brunwasser’s
mind at the time. But more
than that, Brunwasser’s
pleadings and briefs reflect
principally the style of the
Brunwasser v.
stream of consciousness
Trans World
school, so popular in that
Airlines, Inc.,
1981
generation. We were able Critical
518 F. Supp.
to understand dimly the
1321, 1324
action in “Ulysses”, today
(W.D. Pa. 1981)
it is explained by shelves of
guides, commentaries,
companions and
concordances. As Joyce
grew older he became more
difficult and nobody
understood “Finnegan’s
Wake” until the guides and
commentaries began to
appear. No one supplies us
with guides to
Brunwasser’s pleadings.”
Dissent claims that the
child pornography statute
State v. Helgoth,
was overbroad and the
1985 691 S.W.2d 281
Citing
majority opinion would
(Missouri 1985)
permit a statute prohibiting
Ulysses.
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American
Booksellers v.
1985 Hudnut, 771
F.2d 323 (7th
Cir. 1985)

Sarcastically noting that the
Indianapolis pornography
ordinance, which banned
pornography because of
“explicit subordination of
women” would have to
take another look at
banning works like
Ulysses, which depicts
“women as submissive
objects for conquest and
domination.” “Those
opposing the ordinance
Citing
point out that much radical
feminist literature is
explicit and depicts women
in ways forbidden by the
ordinance and that the
ordinance would reopen old
battles. It is unclear how
Indianapolis would treat
works from James Joyce’s
Ulysses to Homer’s Iliad;
both depict women as
submissive objects for
conquest and domination.”

Marshak v.
Marshak, 1992
1992
WL 11168 (D.
Conn. 1992)

Quoting Ulysses (“History
is a nightmare from which I
am trying to awake”) in
reference to a plaintiff’s
Other
tragic history. The quote is
the first sentence of the
opinion.
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Cleveland’s PM
on the
Boardwalk v.
Ohio Liquor
1997
Control
Commission,
1997 WL 25522
(D. Ohio 1997)

Indicating that state
obscenity law would ban
Ulysses and rap songs
generally.

Dayton Tavern
v. Liquor
Control
1999 Commission,
1999 WL
941826 (Ohio
App. 1999)

Cites Ulysses as a work that
could be banned under an Citing
overbroad law.

DRABKOWSKI
v. CITY OF
BIDDEFORD,
1999 1999 Me. Super.
LEXIS 264, *3
(Me. Super. Ct.
Sept. 24, 1999)

“Adult” materials within
the meaning of the
Biddeford ordinance could
run the gamut from soft- Citing
core pornography to works
such as James Joyce’s
Ulysses.

Citing

Noting that James Joyce
would have been convicted
Neder v. United
for selling Ulysses upon a
1999 States, 527 U.S.
Citing
jury using a statewide
1 (1999)
standard for determining
obscenity.
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Conchatta v.
Evanko, 83 Fed.
2003
App’x 437 (3d
Cir. 2003)
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Trouble in defining work to
be penalized under statute,
Critical
such as a reading aloud
from Ulysses.

“The rationality of Policy
Directive 503.00(V) (P)
becomes more questionable
in light of the prison’s
allowance of commercial
pornography. Pol’y Dir.
503.00(III). Consequently,
Cline v. Fox,
the policy permits
319 F. Supp. 2d magazines such as Playboy
2004 685 (N.D.
or Maxim, which objectify Citing
W.Virginia
women in order to sexually
2004)
arouse or gratify men.
(LeMasters Depo. at 38.)
But the policy would
certainly forbid James
Joyce’s Ulysses, ostensibly
because such books ‘create
an intolerable risk of
disorder.’”
“Although drafted by
counsel, the Deed of
Rectification is entirely
Newcom
lacking in basic clarity. For
Holdings v.
example, there are no dates,
IMBROS Corp., either in the Deed’s text or
2005
Critical
369 F. Supp. 2d next to the parties’
700 (E.D.
signatures, to establish
Virginia 2005)
when the Deed went into
effect. Some sections, such
as Section 5, include no
punctuation, resulting in
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Piggee v. Carl
Sandburg
2006 College, 464
F.3d 667 (7th
Cir. 2006)
Couch v. Jabe,
737 F. Supp.
2010
561 (D. Virginia
2010)

Lease v. Fishel,
712 F. Supp. 2d
2010
359, 376 (M.D.
Pa. 2010)

Reyes v. AT&T,
801 F. Supp. 2d
2011
1350 (S.D. Fl.
2011)

run-on prose more like that
used by James Joyce in
Ulysses than the style
expected from lawyers
drafting a document meant
to govern complex business
dealings.” (Footnote
omitted.)
“No college or university is
required to allow a
chemistry professor to
devote extensive classroom
time to the teaching of
James Joyce’s demanding
novel Ulysses.”
Regulation denying prison
inmates access to Ulysses
was found in violation of
the First Amendment.
“Like some of the works of
the great Irish literary
figure, James Joyce,
aspects of this pleading are
written in a stream-ofconsciousness style, one
which presumes that the
reader has a unique insight
into the thoughts of the
writer and can thus give
meaning to seemingly
unconnected ideas. In the
hands of a literary stylist
like Joyce, this manner of
expression can be
challenging; in the hands of
counsel it is sometimes
incomprehensible.”
The “old adage of ‘be
careful what you wish for’”
can be traced back before
Ulysses. Quotes Ulysses:
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Other

Citing

Critical

Other
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“That may be too, Stephen
said. There is a saying of
Goethe’s which Mr. Magee
likes to quote. ‘Beware of
what you wish for in youth
because you will get it in
middle life.’”
“We now turn to the
assertion that the Policy is
unconstitutionally
overbroad. In Cline, relied
upon by Mr. Smith, the
prison policy at issue
prohibited all books,
magazines, photographs,
etc. that contained any
description of sexual
conduct, but allowed
commercial pornography
Smith v. Beard,
such as Playboy. Cline, 319
26 A.3d 551
2011
F.Supp.2d at 693. Thus, the Citing
(Pa. Commw.
policy prohibited books
Ct. 2011)
such as James Joyce’s
Ulysses and George
Orwell’s 1984, but
permitted Playboy. The
district court held that such
a policy was overbroad and
did not bear a reasonable or
rational relationship or
connection to the prison’s
desired goals, which were
akin to the Department’s
rationale for the Policy.”
Wisconsin
Interscholastic
Regarding Ulysses decision
Athletic Ass’n
as one of the “most famous
2011
Citing
v. Gannett Co., free speech decisions in our
658 F.3d 614
history.”
(7th Cir. 2011)
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Catholic Health
Initiatives Iowa
Corp. v.
2012 Sebelius, 841 F.
Supp. 2d 270,
271 (D.D.C.
2012)

Eve Cuyen
Butterworth v.
281 St. Nicholas
Partners LLC,
2014
2014 N.Y. Misc.
LEXIS 3379, *1
(N.Y. Sup. Ct.
July 22, 2014)

Eng v. Tingen,
2015 U.S. Dist.
2015 LEXIS 5634, *4
(E.D.N.C. Jan.
12, 2015)
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Judge Lamberth
characterizes the U.S.
Medicare law as akin to “a
Critical
law written by James Joyce
and edited by E.E.
Cummings.”
“The Defendants move to
strike various paragraphs
and claims in the prolix
complaint in this matter,
which consumes 239
paragraphs and 39 pages
before its culmination. The
Hemingway interpretation
of the complaint (as
Critical
opposed to James Joyce in
Ulysses), is a landlord and
tenant dispute involving
allegations of failing to
maintain the property as
required state and
municipal building
maintenance codes and/or
rent stabilization rules.”
“Eng’s appellate brief is a
stream of consciousness
narrative that would make
James Joyce proud.
Unfortunately for Eng,
Critical
James Joyce is not a good
model to use in writing an
appellate brief.”

VII. WHY THE SHIFT?
From 1934 to 1974, there were sixteen cases referencing Joyce for
the substantive reason that the Ulysses cases are at the foundation of
free speech law in the context of obscenity prosecutions. In that same
time period, there were none that mentioned Joyce to criticize his

2016

Ulysses: A Mighty Hero in the Fight

309

writing. From 1975 on there were fourteen cases referencing Joyce
substantively and eight for negative stylistic reasons. Did Joyce simply
fall out of fashion once “Members Only” jackets came into style? If
we examine 1981 to the present, the comparison is even starker.
An analysis of the psychological profiles of the affected judges is
beyond the scope of this work. However, anecdotally, it seems that the
descent from respect to derision followed political speech into its
downward spiral of anti-intellectualism. 119 If we examine political
rhetoric in the United States, we discover that State of the Union
addresses were written for college graduates during the 19th century,
but now target Americans with a mere eighth-grade reading level. 120
In fact, the descent has been constant and rapid. An in-depth study
shows that the 1934 State of the Union address was delivered at a 15.7
Flesch-Kincaid level.121 By the time George W. Bush took office, the
level was a 7.5.122
Although the descent has been long, on November 4, 1981,
America elected Ronald Reagan as President, and a long period of
anti-intellectual rule took hold. 123 From that point forward,
intellectualism was a political liability. Although the President and the
judicial branch are separate, the President nominates Supreme Court

119

120

121

122
123

See generally ELVIN T. LIM, THE ANTI-INTELLECTUAL PRESIDENCY: THE
DECLINE OF PRESIDENTIAL RHETORIC FROM GEORGE WASHINGTON TO GEORGE
W. BUSH (2008).
Dr. Eric Ostermeyer, “My Message is Simple”: Obama’s SOTU Written at 8th
Grade Level for Third Straight Year, SMART POLITICS (Mar. 2, 2016),
http://editions.lib.umn.edu/smartpolitics/2012/01/25/my-message-is-simpleobamas-so/.
Id. The Flesch-Kincaid test assesses written text, with a formula that translates
the score to a U.S. grade level. Longer sentences with more syllables yield
higher scores.
See id.
Reagan was apt to tear down the Free Speech movement with his “obey the rules
or get out” mentality. Steven Hayward, Ronald Regan and the Transformation
of Modern California, 6 NEXUS: J. OP. 145, 151 (2001). “[W]hile Reagan was in
real life in awe of intellectuals, ‘Reagan, in the long tradition of populism,
certainly exploited the anti-intellectual biases of his constituencies.’” LIM, supra
note 119, at 152 n.37. Reagan also attempted to take down Roe v. Wade. See
Lawrence G. Sager, Memoirs of a General in the Inglorious Revolution Order
and Law: Arguing the Reagan Revolution, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1203, 1214 (1992).
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justices, the Senate confirms them and all other federal judges, and a
culture of rejecting intellectuals as proper guardians of democracy was
fully in place by the time MTV came on the air. It is a reasonable
hypothesis that the judiciary simply followed the trend, with a calm
rejection of intellectualism that would no longer tolerate the likes of
Joyce in its ranks. Coupled with a sharp shift to the right in the
judiciary, the die was cast: Joyce was no longer in favor.
IV. THE CONTINUED IMPORTANCE OF JOYCE SCHOLARSHIP TODAY
Where does that leave us today? With American judges embracing
anti-intellectualism to the point that few lawyers even remember that
we owe much of our freedom of expression to James Joyce, is it any
surprise that the view from the bench is not one that puts Joyce in an
overwhelmingly positive light? Halfway through its history as a “free
book,” Ulysses and its author were universally mentioned only in the
most positive of lights—as positive precedent or as worthy of
protection. But, since that midway point, we find ourselves looking at
a very different view from the robed ones.
The mere fact that there is such a thing as an academic who
devotes their time to the study of Ulysses is a victory in itself—and as
much as I think that Anthony Comstock and his ilk should be relegated
to unkind corners of history books, I must thank them as well: In their
zeal to ban Ulysses, we found the confrontation we needed in order to
lay the cornerstone for the edifice that would become modern free
speech jurisprudence.
I point out that it is the mere cornerstone. In more modern times,
we find ourselves confronted with a horde of anti-intellectualism,
which threatens to push back the liberating tide that came in that day
in 1934. Further, we have found continued artistic persecution against
humorists, pornographers, and musicians alike. George Carlin, 124

124

FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978). Also known as the “Filthy
Words” or “Seven Dirty Words” case, wherein the U.S. Supreme Court decided
that the FCC served a compelling government interest in protecting children
from offensive material by prohibiting such broadcasts during certain hours.
“Shit, piss, fuck, cunt, cocksucker, motherfucker, and tits!” George Carlin,
Seven Words You Can Never Say on Television (1972).

2016

Ulysses: A Mighty Hero in the Fight

311

Lenny Bruce,125 Al Goldstein,126 Larry Flynt,127 and 2 Live Crew128 all
stood on the ramparts that Ulysses itself originally built. Those
ramparts are built from the working-class language and brutal honesty
that sprang from Joyce’s mind. And, although it is not a legal text,
Ulysses is as important to our concepts of liberty as anything penned
by any jurist, perhaps with the exception of Holmes’s dissent.129 “We
need to understand how and why [changes in obscenity law] occurred.
Reviewing this history is important, too, because it out to make us
humble about our certainties.”130 Ulysses is not just a gift to literature,
Ulysses is a gift to freedom—and as such, lyric it was, and lyric it is.
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Bruce was arrested on obscenity charges after a 1961 comedy show for using the
word “cocksucker” and commenting that anyone offended by the sexual use of
the term “to come” “probably can’t come.” He was arrested on three different
occasions in 1962 and was eventually sentenced to a year in jail. A long run of
obscenity, drug, and money laundering cases ended when Bruce was arrested
after a New York show where undercover officers claimed he used obscene
language more than 100 times, including “jack me off,” and “nice tits.” In 2003,
Bruce was granted a gubernatorial pardon from the state of New York. See Doug
Linder, The Trials of Lenny Bruce, (2003), http://law2.umkc.edu/faculty/
projects/ftrials/bruce/bruceaccount.html.
People v. Heller, 307 N.E.2d 805 (1973) (Goldstein’s conviction for distributing
obscene materials within his newspaper SCREW was upheld as constitutional
under the Miller test).
Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988). The First Amendment
protected a parody piece about Jerry Falwell’s “first time” which appeared in
Flynt’s Hustler magazine in 1983 when the U.S. Supreme Court held that public
figures cannot be compensated for intentional infliction of emotional distress
resulting from protected speech.
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569 (1994). In a unanimous U.S.
Supreme Court decision, 2 Live Crew’s parody of Roy Orbison’s “Oh, Pretty
Woman” was protected as parody under the First Amendment and copyright
law.
See, e.g., Hon. George T. Anagnost, Book Review: The Legal Odyssey of Joyce’s
Ulysses—Review of The Most Dangerous Book, 51 ARIZ. ATT’Y 56 (2015);
Stephen Gillers, A Tendency to Deprave and Corrupt: The Transformation of
American Obscenity Law from Hicklin to Ulysses II, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 215
(2007).
Gillers, supra note 129, at 223.

